

SECRET ATTACHMENT

November 10, 1962

TO : S/AL - Mr. Thompson
G - Mr. Johnson
IO - Mr. Cleveland

SUBJECT: Special National Intelligence Estimate

Attached is an advance copy of a Special National Intelligence Estimate agreed to yesterday by the U.S. Intelligence Board. I have no doubt that this document will be put to immediate use in various discussions around town, and because of the high level interest which was responsible for its preparation, I believe you will want to read it immediately.

TH
Thomas L. Hughes
Acting Director

Attachment:

Copy of SNIE 85-4-62,
dated 9 November, 1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SECRETARY OF STATE

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 85-4-62

Nov 9 1963

**Castro's Subversive Capabilities
in Latin America**

SANITIZED

Authority NLS-85-267

By lio, NARS, Date 10-30-86

CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

THE PROBLEM

To describe and evaluate Castro's capabilities, with Soviet help, for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Latin America

NOTE: In this estimate we have considered Castro's raw capabilities, taking note of, but not working out in detail, US and Latin American capabilities for counteraction.

SUMMARY

A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails throughout much of Latin America is the product of fundamental inequities and historic circumstances; it is not the creation of Castro and the Soviets. Castro's efforts, with Soviet help, to exploit this situation by means of subversion and sabotage have not produced significant results. Propaganda exploitation of Castro and Cuba as symbols of revolution has probably been more effective to date than other subversive activities.

B.

[REDACTED]

the effect of Castro's subversive activities will depend not only upon his capabilities but upon the attractiveness of the Cuban example and the willingness of the American governments to take determined counteraction.

[REDACTED]

C. [REDACTED]

THE ESTIMATE

1. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE MISSILE BASE CRISIS¹

Aims

1. From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has sought to gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for others and of himself as the leader of revolutionary forces throughout Latin America. He has constantly sought to foment revolutions in other Latin American States. Moreover, Castro has generally had the support of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the pursuit of these aims.

Means

2. Castro began his career of sponsorship for revolutions in Latin America in 1959 with landings of small rebel forces in Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. None of these were successful and he turned to other means.

3. From the beginning, propaganda has been one of the principal instruments on which Castro has relied. In addition to the main transmissions of Radio Havana for external listeners, which have had a great deal of revolutionary content, he has beamed special programs devised to stimulate revolutionary action to each of half a dozen selected countries.² A major effort has been made through Prensa Latina, the Cuban news service, to disseminate Castro-Communist propaganda. Printed propaganda has also been sent from Cuba into most other Latin American States, and Cuban diplomatic missions and personnel have actively disseminated it. Students returning from indoctrination in Cuba have helped establish Cuban Institutes for Friendship among Peoples which have functioned as propaganda outlets.

4. Thousands of Latin Americans have been brought to Cuba; [redacted] Many hundreds have been trained in revolutionary techniques and guerrilla warfare. Cuba has been made a main transit point for travel between Latin America and the Bloc.

5. Financial support has been provided by Cuba to revolutionary groups in a number of countries, although the cases on which we have reports involved relatively small sums of money. Arms shipments have [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

also been reported, but the evidence is unclear as to quantities shipped and the extent of Cuba's role in these transactions. We believe that there is an extensive agent net in Latin America directed from Havana.

6. Castro has associated himself with revolutionary activist groups throughout Latin America. In most cases these have been Communist, but where the regular Communist Party favored a legal or parliamentary line he has not hesitated to support dissident Communist groups, e.g., in Brazil, and non-Communist revolutionaries, e.g., in Guatemala and El Salvador. In some cases he has sponsored new revolutionary organizations, [REDACTED] Chile he has endorsed a popular front coalition made up of Communist and moderate leftists.

Evolution

7. Instances of financial and material support sent by Cuba to revolutionaries in other countries which have come to our attention are probably only a part of the total effort. Even so, the effort seems to have been relatively small and ineffective. Yet along with the political and psychological stimulus which Castro's influence has provided, Cuban subversive activities have perceptibly strengthened activist revolutionary groups. Dangerous situations subject to exploitation by Castro and the Communists exist in a number of Latin American countries—

[REDACTED] These dangers arise from political and social tensions which existed long before Castro came to power. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Response of Castro Supporters to Missile Base Crisis

10. Castro's supporters throughout Latin America, with few though important exceptions (e.g., sabotage of oil facilities in Venezuela), failed to respond to the missile base crisis with effective acts of sabotage or with impressive public demonstrations. Two important limiting factors should be taken into account in judging this response, however. US action to alert Latin American governments led them to make extensive advance preparation, including deployment of security forces and the roundup of suspects, a condition of readiness which is unlikely to be maintained indefinitely. There also may have been some uncertainty among the activist followers of Castro whether they should make their big effort in response to the announcement of the US blockade, or wait for the anticipated US invasion. Moscow's apparent failure to provide guidance may have contributed to the confusion. It is our judgment, however, that the response to Castro's appeal for attacks on the US and its friends indicates that his power to command revolutionary action, at least in the circumstances of the missile base crisis, is limited.

Support Which Castro Can Expect in the Future

11. The range of Castro's support has been, we believe, considerably narrowed by events since Castro declared himself a Communist. Revelation of the fact that he had allowed the Soviets to establish offensive bases under exclusive Soviet control has alienated many non-Communist nationalists, genuine neutralists, and even revolutionaries seeking social and economic betterment. San Tiago Dantas, formerly Foreign Minister under President Goulart and an author of Brazil's nonalignment policy, and leading Mexican officials have publicly expressed their disenchantment.

12. The activist revolutionaries are probably the only important force on which Castro can now count, but even their support has apparently been rendered less effective by differences on the question of Soviet relations with Castro and with Latin American Communist parties.

[REDACTED]

8

Castro's Resources for Continued Subversive Activity

13. Arms. (See Annex B.) Castro has substantial stocks of arms. In addition to Soviet Bloc materiel there are stores of arms inherited from the Batista regime not being used by Castro forces and available for distribution outside Cuba. In the past he has apparently been hampered in his efforts to use arms for subversive purposes by problems of transport and delivery.

[REDACTED]

14. Propaganda apparatus. Castro's propaganda machine remains intact. For the time being, however, his diplomatic missions are likely to find it harder to disseminate propaganda than in the past, both because of new precautions by local governments and because of a reduction in the numbers of cooperative volunteers outside the organized Communist groups.

15. Money and equipment. [REDACTED] believe that the Soviets will continue to supply Castro with money, supplies, and equipment for subversive activity.

[REDACTED]

16. Organization. The organization of Castro's subversive assets throughout Latin America was shown by the recent crisis to be loose and otherwise faulty. We estimate that Castro will make a strong effort to strengthen and improve it, and that he will continue to receive support in this effort from the Soviet apparatus, both in Cuba itself, [REDACTED] and in other important centers of Soviet activity such as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

18. Situation in Cuba

Castro's position in Cuba will depend in part on his own policies, but is likely to depend even more upon those of the Soviets.

19. *Alternative Soviet policies.* There are several courses of action with respect to Cuba which the Soviets are likely to consider. Some leaders may argue that the whole policy of economic and military support for Castro should be abandoned along with the plan for the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba. We believe, however, that the Soviet stake in Cuba as an ally and as a Soviet center in Latin America is still too high to abandon.

Likely Future Targets for Cuban Sabotage

23. The extent of Castro's capabilities for sabotage and other clandestine activity in Latin America will depend upon the complicated factors noted above. Whatever his capabilities are, he will not be at a loss for targets against which to use them. Some of the more obvious targets are:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(1) [REDACTED]



ANNEX A

HIGHLIGHTS OF CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN
OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO DATE

1. Cuban subversive activities of one sort or another have been directed toward virtually every other Latin American State. Cuban Embassies have been without exception centers for propaganda and efforts to cultivate receptive local groups, whether they be Castroite, regular Communist, leftist, or simply disgruntled with the existing regime.* The Cuban Embassy is commonly a disburser of funds for subversive purposes. Radio propaganda from Havana has been and is being beamed at each of the Latin American States, sometimes tailored to have particular local impact. Sympathetic nationals from the other Latin American States have been encouraged and given financial support to come to Cuba for varying lengths of time for training, goodwill visits, or for purposes of instruction and coordination of subversive programs.

2. The above represents a general pattern. There are, of course, significant variations and different degrees of effort, depending on how Castro's regime views the importance and vulnerability of the target country. The following represents a summary, country by country, of the most typical reports of Cuban subversive activity available to us. (See paragraphs 3-8 of subject memorandum for evaluation of Castro's subversive activities to date.)

A. Argentina

- (1) A "Cuban-Argentine Friendship Institute" exists [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(2) [REDACTED]
(3) [REDACTED]

B. Bolivia

- (1) [REDACTED] Bolivians will receive "scholarships" in Cuba during 1962.

*Only five countries still have Cuban Embassies: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay.

(2)



(3)



C. Brazil

(1)



(2)



D. British Guiana

- (1) The Castro regime has been hospitable to the leadership of the dominant People's Progressive Party (PPP) in Guiana, and Premier Cheddi Jagan, his wife, and other members of the PPP have traveled to Cuba and made enthusiastic comments about the Castro regime.

(2)



(3)



(4)



E. Chile

- (1) Senator Salvador Allende, leader of Chile's Communist-dominated Popular Front and a leading presidential aspirant, has made at least two trips to Cuba. He has been an outspoken defender of Castro.

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) A number of students from Chile have undergone Communist indoctrination in Cuba.

(4) [REDACTED]

F. Colombia

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED]

(4) [REDACTED]

G. Costa Rica

H. The Dominican Republic

(1) Under its provisional Council of State the Dominican Republic has been a major target for Cuban subversion, and regular radio broadcasts to the Dominican Republic from Cuba have helped incite the frequent riots in Santo Domingo.

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED]

(4)

I. Ecuador

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4) Ecuador has received substantial quantities of Communist propaganda.

J. El Salvador

On 1 March 1961, the Salvadoran Government broke relations with the Castro regime after receiving evidence that the Cuban charge was urging increased revolutionary activity on the part of Salvadoran Communists.

K. Guatemala

(1)

(2)

L. Haiti

M. Honduras

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) Many Hondurans are in Cuba under the "scholarship" program.

(3) Honduras now is the target of a particularly vicious regular radio program beamed especially to Honduras by Radio Havana.

N. Jamaica

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

O. Mexico

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED]

P. Nicaragua

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

Q. Panama

[REDACTED]

R. Paraguay

- (1) Cuban efforts with regard to Paraguay take the form of financial support and direction to exiled opposition groups [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED]

S. Peru

(1) [REDACTED]

- (2) Although still in the organizational stage, pro-Communist guerrillas and other leftist extremist groups have been operating intermittently in Peru for many months [REDACTED]

T. Trinidad

The local Communist-front party has been more active [REDACTED]

U. Uruguay

- (1) Uruguay is [REDACTED] important center of operations [REDACTED] for both Castro and the Soviets.
- (2) The activities of the Cuban Embassy in Montevideo in promoting pro-Castro propaganda led the Uruguayan Government in January 1961 to declare the Cuban Ambassador persona non grata for interference in internal Uruguayan affairs.

V. Venezuela

- (1) The Castro regime has been particularly vitriolic in its propaganda attacks on the Betancourt government.
- (2) There is in Venezuela the most active and best supported Communist guerrilla movement in Latin America. [REDACTED]
- (3) Pro-Castro elements were probably involved in recent violence, during the Cuban crisis, which resulted in the blowing up of US-owned oil facilities in Venezuela.

ANNEX B

PAGES 19-22

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SNIE 85-4-62
9 November 1962

SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 85-4-62

**Castro's Subversive Capabilities
in Latin America**

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
9 NOVEMBER 1962

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
6 FEB 1986
DATE _____

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Nº 397

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downgrading and
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SUMMARY

A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails throughout much of Latin America is the product of fundamental inequities and historic circumstances; it is not the creation of Castro and the Soviets. Castro's efforts, with Soviet help, to exploit this situation by means of subversion and sabotage have not produced significant results.



B.

[REDACTED]

There are many targets in the hemisphere vulnerable to Castro-Communist subversion and sabotage, and the Soviets are likely to assist Castro in reaching them by contributing both to his security at home and to his capability for action overseas.

[REDACTED]

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Aims

1. From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has sought to gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for others and of himself as the leader of revolutionary forces throughout Latin America. He has constantly sought to foment revolutions in other Latin American States. Moreover, Castro has generally had the support of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the pursuit of these aims.

Means

2. Castro began his career of sponsorship for revolutions in Latin America in 1959 with landings of small rebel forces in Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. None of these were successful and he turned to other means.

3. From the beginning, propaganda has been one of the principal instruments on which Castro has relied. In addition to the main transmissions of Radio Havana for external listeners, which have had a great deal of revolutionary content, he has beamed special programs devised to stimulate revolutionary action to each of half a dozen selected countries. A major effort has been made through Prensa Latina, the Cuban news service, to disseminate Castro-Communist propaganda. Printed propaganda has also been sent from Cuba into most other Latin American States, and Cuban diplomatic missions and personnel have actively disseminated it. Students returning from indoctrination in Cuba have helped establish Cuban Institutes for Friendship among Peoples which have functioned as propaganda outlets.

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5. Financial support has been provided by Cuba to revolutionary groups in a number of countries. Arms shipments have

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We believe that

there is an extensive agent net in Latin America directed from Havana.

6 Castro has associated himself with revolutionary activist groups throughout Latin America. In most cases these have been Communist, but where the regular Communist Party favored a legal or parliamentary line he has not hesitated to support dissident Communist groups, e.g. in Brazil, and non-Communist revolutionaries, e.g. in Guatemala and El Salvador. In some cases he has sponsored new revolutionary organizations, e.g. in Panama, Colombia and Chile. In Chile he has endorsed a popular front coalition made up of Communist and moderate leftists.

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7. Instances of financial and material support from Cuba to revolutionaries in other countries which have come to our attention are probably only a part of the total effort.

Yet along with the political and psychological stimulus which Castro's influence has provided, Cuban subversive activities have perceptibly strengthened activist revolutionary groups. Dangerous situations subject to exploitation by Castro and the Communists exist in a number of Latin American countries—

These dangers arise from political and social tensions which existed long before Castro came to power. They might be dormant for some time; but with Castro as a potential detonator, they are more likely to blow up. The detonative compound will exist as long as Castroism survives, whatever may happen to Castro personally.

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Support Which Castro Can Expect in the Future

11. The range of Castro's support has been, we believe, considerably narrowed by events since Castro declared himself a Communist. Revelation of the fact that he had allowed the Soviets to establish offensive bases under exclusive Soviet control has alienated many non-Communist nationalists, genuine neutralists, and even revolutionaries seeking social and economic betterment.

12. The activist revolutionaries are probably the only important force on which Castro can now count, but even their support has apparently been rendered less effective by differences on the question of Soviet relations with Castro and with Latin American Communist parties.

Castro's Military and Subversive Activities

13. Arms. [redacted] (Castro has substantial stocks of arms. In addition to Soviet Bloc materiel there are stores of arms inherited from the Batista regime not being used by Castro forces and available for distribution outside Cuba. In the past he has apparently been hampered in his efforts to use arms for subversive purposes by problems of transport and delivery. He has at his disposal, however, 12 IL-14 transports belonging to Cubana airlines which could be used to deliver arms under certain circumstances. The IL-28's now in Cuba are inappropriate for subversive purposes. However, they could be used for air drops. Cuba has many small craft suitable for infiltration of men and arms.)

[redacted]

14. Propaganda apparatus. Castro's propaganda machine remains intact. For the time being, however, his diplomatic missions are likely to find it harder to disseminate propaganda than in the past, both because of new precautions by local governments and because of a reduction in the numbers of cooperative volunteers outside the organized Communist groups.

15. Money and equipment.

[redacted] we believe that the Soviets will continue to supply Castro with money, supplies, and equipment for subversive activity. The Soviets have certainly supplied Castro with sophisticated instruments of intelligence collection, sabotage, and clandestine communications.

16. Organization.

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18. Situation in Cuba: Castro's ability to engage in subversive activities will be influenced significantly by the strength and stability of his position and the political and economic difficulties in Cuba. While the more secure he is at home, the more freedom and effectiveness he is likely to have for subverting other governments and establishing his prestige and influence. Castro's position in Cuba will depend in part on his own policies, but is likely to depend even more upon those of the Soviets.

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21.

Likely Future Targets for Cuban Sabotage

23. The extent of Castro's capabilities for sabotage and other clandestine activity in Latin America will depend upon the complicated factors noted above. Whatever his capabilities are, he will not be at a loss for targets against which to use them. Some of the more obvious targets are:

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[REDACTED]

b. Physical targets vulnerable to a limited sabotage effort.

[REDACTED]

d. Political targets susceptible to exploitation.

[REDACTED]




ANNEX A


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
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
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


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